Following the Seventh Circuit’s invalidation of Springfield’s anti-panhandling ordinance, the city amended its municipal code’s provisions regarding panhandling.  The new code provisions prohibited panhandling “[p]anhandling while at any time before, during, or after the solicitation knowingly approaching within five feet of the solicited person,” and defined “panhandling” as a “vocal appeal” for an immediate donation.  Distinguishing the city’s ordinance from the Colorado law at issue in the 2000 Supreme Court case of Hill v. Colorado, the district court found that the new code provisions were content based.  Because the ordinance applied only in cases where the requestor asked for an immediate donation of money or other gratuity while within five feet of the solicited person, the district court found the ordinance content based and concluded that the city could not meet strict scrutiny.

Norton v. City of Springfield, No. 15-3276, slip op., 2015 WL 8023461 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2015)

One of the big questions coming out of the Supreme Court’s decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert was whether Reed’s standard for content neutrality analysis would change past Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding regulations of adult businesses.  Under the precedents set in Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc. and City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., adult businesses can be specially regulated by local governments under the theory that the regulations are content neutral because they are targeted at the “secondary effects” of such businesses.  Reed held that any facially content based law should be subject to strict scrutiny.  Laws that apply to adult businesses are arguably facially content based, since they apply to particular forms of speech and expression.  Thus, there was skepticism that Reed might portend an overruling of prior cases regarding adult businesses.   Continue Reading Seventh Circuit Hints That Reed Does Not Apply In Adult Business Regulation Cases

The Village of Downers Grove, Illinois survived federal and state law challenges to its sign code after a federal district court found the code to be content neutral under the standard articulated in the Supreme Court’s decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert.  Plaintiff Robert Peterson owns a business called Leibundguth Storage & Van Service, Inc., which painted large signs advertising its business on the walls of its brick building in Downers Grove.  The village’s sign ordinance banned painted wall signs and limited the size and number of wall signs.  Peterson argued that the sign code was content based because it exempted government signs, railroad signs, address signs, noncommercial flags, real estate signs, and decorations, among other sign types, from the village’s permitting requirement.   Continue Reading Illinois Village Survives Sign Code Challenge

Nightclub operators challenged Wickliffe, Ohio’s nightclub ordinance, which required permits for the operation of for-profit nightclubs, defined by the ordinance as places “to engage in social activities such as dancing; the enjoyment of live or prerecorded music; the serving of food and beverages; all of which are provided for a consideration that may be included in a cover charge or included in the price of the food and beverage.”  The nightclub operators claimed that the ordinance limited the right to assembly.  The court held that the permitting of businesses is not a regulation of expression or assembly, even though some First Amendment-protected activity might be implicated in an attenuated manner.  The court also found that the permitting requirement was not overbroad because it did not reach a substantial amount of protected expression or other protected conduct.

Miller v. City of Wickliffe, No. 1:12-CV1248, slip op., 2015 WL 9304665 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 2015)

A women’s health counseling service was denied in its efforts to advertise on buses operated by the Fort Wayne, Indiana public bus system.  The bus system’s advertising policy prohibited noncommercial advertising of any nature but allows the display of public service announcements.  The federal district court found that the bus advertising space constituted a nonpublic forum, and that the policy and its implementation by the bus system were viewpoint neutral, and thus there was no First Amendment violation.

Women’s Health Link, Inc. v. Fort Wayne Pub. Transp. Corp., ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2016 WL 67288 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 5, 2016)

Panama City, Florida passed five ordinances aimed at reducing the impacts of spring break revelers in the popular Gulf Coast tourist destination.  One of the ordinances limited the hours of alcoholic beverage sales during the month of March, while others limited possession or consumption of alcohol in commercial parking lots, on City right-of-ways, and on the beach.  Several entertainment businesses filed suit against the City, including with First Amendment Free Speech claims.  The federal district court assumed that the conduct in question was speech, but found that the ordinances in question were justified without reference to the content of the speech in question, and were proper time, place, and manner restrictions that provided ample alternative channels for communication of the entertainment.  The court additionally found that the City had relied on adequate evidence of criminal activity and other antisocial behavior in enacting the ordinances.  The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.

Funtana Vill., Inc. v. City of Panama Beach, No. 5:15CV282-MW/GRJ, slip op., 2016 WL 375102 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2016)

Plaintiff Recycle for Change uses unattended donation and collection boxes in Oakland, California to collect donations of used textiles.  Oakland passed an ordinance requiring such boxes to be permitted, which in turn requires payment of a permitting fee of $535.  The ordinance additionally imposed dispersal requirements between such boxes, as well as the location and physical characteristics of such boxes.  The federal district court found that the ordinance did not constitute a total ban on the boxes and, because it only regulated the physical characteristics of donation boxes, did not constitute a content based regulation.  Because the plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the merits, the court denied the motion for preliminary injunction.

Recycle for Change v. City of Oakland, No. 15-CV-05093-WHO, slip op., 2016 WL 344751 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016)

In Central Radio, Inc. v. City of Norfolk, a case that was caught up in the maelstrom surrounding the Supreme Court’s decision in Reed, the Fourth Circuit reversed its previous decision upholding the Norfolk, Virginia sign code, finding that the code contained content based restrictions on speech.  In this case, which we reported on previously, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiff’s petition for certiorari, vacated the Fourth Circuit’s opinion, and remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit for reconsideration in light of Reed.  In reconsidering the case, the appellate court determined that, because the Norfolk sign code exempted governmental or religious flags and emblems while requiring permits for private and secular flags and emblems, and because the code contained an exemption for artwork that did not identify a product or service, the code was content based.  The court went on to find that the city’s asserted interests in traffic safety and aesthetic beautification were not compelling interests and that the code was not narrowly tailored, thus failing strict scrutiny.  More news on the case can be found here.

During the pendency of the case, Norfolk updated its sign code to comport with the holding of Reed.  The Fourth Circuit found that the case was not moot, yet the court did not weigh in on the constitutionality of the new code.

Cent. Radio, Inc. v. City of Norfolk, ___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL 360775

In a case unrelated to signs, but which relied upon some issues relating to sign law, a church sought to hold Sunday religious services in the community rooms of public housing facilities in Lansing, Michigan, but the public housing commission denied use of the community rooms because the commission determined that the community rooms should not be used for religious activities.  The church challenged the commission’s determination under the Free Speech and Equal Protection clauses of the First Amendment.  Applying a public forum analysis, the court found that the community rooms were either limited or nonpublic fora, thus requiring the commission’s restrictions to be viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the purposes of the forum.  Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Good News Club v. Milford Central School, the federal court in Michigan found that the commission’s prohibition on religious activities was viewpoint based, as the community rooms could be used for general teaching of morals or character development, but not for religious activities.  The court proceeded to issue a preliminary injunction against the commission.

His Healing Hands Church v. Lansing Hous. Comm’n, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2016 WL 369489 (W.D. Mich., Feb. 1, 2016)