The Portland ordinance required a sign much like this one to be posted on an unreinforced masonry building. Source: Willamette Week.

This post was authored by Alexandra Haggarty.  Alex is a summer clerk at Otten Johnson, and a rising 3L at the University of Colorado Law School.

In a case challenging a Portland, Oregon ordinance, a federal judge granted a preliminary injunction to a group of building owners who would have been compelled to post a potentially misleading message.  The judge, suspecting the city was not forthcoming about its real motive behind the ordinance, found the requirements failed strict scrutiny and burdened First Amendment rights.

Portland has long encouraged owners of unreinforced masonry buildings (“URMs”) to retrofit and reinforce their properties to be stronger in the event of a major earthquake, but has remained unable to garner enough political and public support to mandate doing so.  Instead, it implemented an ordinance requiring owners of designated buildings to display exterior placards disclosing the risks of major earthquakes in URMs. The ordinance required the placard state: “This is an unreinforced masonry building. Unreinforced masonry buildings may be unsafe in the event of a major earthquake.”  The ordinance also required owners to (1) include a tenant notification provision in lease applications disclaiming risk and (2) document compliance with the ordinance. Continue Reading Portland’s “Earthquake Warning” Placards Found To Violate First Amendment

One of the signs at issue in the case. Source: Riverfront Times.

In a case that we reported on around this time last year, late last month, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a federal district court’s ruling denying a motion for preliminary injunction against Bel-Nor, Missouri’s “one sign” rule.  The Eighth Circuit’s ruling means that the city will be temporary enjoined from enforcing the law.

The facts of the case are discussed in our earlier post.

The court of appeals had no problem finding that the city’s sign regulation violated the First Amendment.  The law allows just one freestanding yard sign, as well as one flag.  The definition of “flag” in the city’s code indicates that the object must be a “symbol of a government or institution,” thus drawing a distinction based on the message a speaker conveys.  Applying the Supreme Court’s holding in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the court found the regulation was content based.  The court then found that the code was not narrowly tailored so as to pass muster under strict scrutiny. Continue Reading Appeals Court Reverses Order Upholding Missouri Enclave’s One-Sign Rule

Earlier this month, a federal district court in Kansas awarded summary judgment to a plaintiff who claimed that the City of Williamsburg’s sign code violated the First Amendment.

The plaintiff, Eric Clark, placed several signs and other objects in a city right-of-way easement.  The city issued a notice of violation, which set off a series of interactions between the city’s code enforcement officer and Clark, and Clark issued several letters to the city claiming various violations of his civil rights.  Although the city desisted from further enforcement action, Clark, representing himself, filed a lawsuit against the city. Continue Reading Pro Se Plaintiff Claims Victory Against Kansas Community In Sign Code Dispute

The American Legion in Howell Township. Source: www.whmi.com.

Two weeks ago, a federal district court granted the motion to dismiss of Joe Daus, the zoning administrator for Howell Township, Michigan, in a case challenging the township’s billboard regulations.

Crossroads Outdoor is a billboard company that sought to install a sign on property owned by the local American Legion post in Howell Township.  The township, through Daus, denied the variance on the grounds that it was not permissible to place the sign in the parking lot of the American Legion.  After some back and forth on the application, the township eventually passed a moratorium on new signs in 2018 pending the adoption of a new sign ordinance.  Crossroads’s sign application has not yet been approved. Continue Reading Court Grants Zoning Administrator’s Motion to Dismiss in Michigan Billboard Case

Tattooing is protected by the First Amendment. Source: Creative Commons.

Two weeks ago, a federal district court in California granted preliminary injunctive relief to a tattoo shop owner who challenged the City of Montebello, California’s geographic restrictions on body art establishments.

Montebello’s regulation prohibits tattoo parlors within 1,000 feet of certain sensitive uses, including residential properties, schools, libraries, and religious institutions.  The effect of the regulation is to limit such establishments to two small shopping centers in the city.  Tattoo parlors are also subject to a conditional use permit requirement, in which the city is required to determine that the use will not have an adverse effect on surrounding properties and that it is consistent with city planning goals. Continue Reading Court Grants Preliminary Injunction in California Tattoo Parlor Case

An apartment advertised for short-term rental. Source: Creative Commons.

Last month, the federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction in a case initiated by HomeAway and Airbnb challenging the City of Santa Monica, California’s short-term rental regulations.  The plaintiffs in the case alleged violations of the First Amendment right to freedom of association.

Located on the Pacific coast and known as a tourist destination, by early 2018, Santa Monica had nearly 2,000 Airbnb or HomeAway listings—in a city of just 90,000 residents.  In response to the various problems created by short-term rentals, the city council passed an ordinance limiting short-term rentals to only “home-shares,” where the resident of the unit is present during the rental period.  Santa Monica also collects taxes on short-term rentals, requires licenses, and imposes disclosure obligations on hosts.  HomeAway and Airbnb filed a variety of challenges to the ordinance, and moved for a preliminary injunction, which was denied by the district court. Continue Reading Ninth Circuit Affirms Denial of Preliminary Injunction in Santa Monica Short-Term Rental Case

Déjà Vu of Nashville, Inc. is a business engaged “in the presentation of female performance dance entertainment to the consenting adult public.”  More prosaically, Déjà Vu operates a strip club.  That business, you will not be surprised to learn, has its detractors.  After those detractors found themselves unable to prevent Déjà Vu from operating as a permitted use in downtown Nashville, they took aim at Déjà Vu’s planned valet service, which was to be operated by a third party.  They succeeded in persuading the city to deny the permit application for that valet service.  In return, Continue Reading Tennessee District Court Dismisses Strip Club’s First Amendment Claim

The rats and cats are back.  We first reported on this case in 2016, after the Seventh Circuit determined that it might be moot.  As it turns out, the case was not moot, and “Scabby the Rat” returned to the appeals court again.  In a ruling last month, the Seventh Circuit found that the district court properly determined that the town’s ordinance prohibiting the inflatable rat was not content based and accorded with the First Amendment.

The facts of the case can be found in our earlier post.  After the Seventh Circuit suggested that the case might be moot due to an agreement between the union and employer, the case went back to the district court.  The district court subsequently found the case not to be moot, as the union was seeking damages for its inability to place the rat in the right-of-way.  In its ruling, the district court then found that the ordinance in question—which prohibited the placement of private signs in town right-of-ways—was content neutral and survived First Amendment scrutiny. Continue Reading Seventh Circuit Upholds Wisconsin Ordinance Prohibiting Inflatable “Scabby the Rat”

Nashville Pride Festival. Source: The Tennessean.

In a case that we reported on over a year ago, last fall, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a Tennessee judge’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the Nashville metropolitan government, finding instead that the relocation of protesters at Nashville’s Pride Festival violated the protesters’ First Amendment rights.

The facts of the case can be found in our prior post.  In short, this case arose from Nashville’s exclusion of anti-homosexuality preachers from the city’s annual Pride Festival, which celebrates the LGBT community of Nashville.

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court that the area in question was a traditional public forum.  However, the appeals court found the relocation of the protesters to be content based.  Although Nashville contended that the relocation of the protesters was content neutral, because the speech in question interfered with the Pride Festival, its location obstructed ingress and egress to the Festival, and the protesters presented a danger to public safety due to the crowds that they drew.  The appellate court found that the first of these reasons was itself content based, since the protesters’ message was itself the reason that it interfered with the Festival.  In applying strict scrutiny, the Sixth Circuit found that the city had failed to demonstrate any compelling interest justifying its exclusion of the protesters from the Festival.

McGlone v. Metro. Govt. of Nashville, 749 Fed. Appx. 402 (6th Cir. 2018).

An example of San Francisco’s warning label. Image credit: Behavioral Science and Policy. Used subject to license.

A San Francisco ordinance requiring health warnings on advertisements for some sugar-sweetened beverages has suffered an early defeat.  On January 31, the Ninth Circuit ruled, en banc, that the district court should have granted plaintiff American Beverage Association’s request for a preliminary injunction to prevent the ordinance’s enforcement.

At issue was the ordinance’s required rectangular warning label—similar to such labels for cigarettes—occupying 20% of any advertisement for many sugar-sweetened beverages.  The text of the warning was to read as follow: “WARNING: Drinking beverages with added sugar(s) contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay. This is a message from the City and County of San Francisco.”  Arguing that the ordinance impermissibly compelled commercial speech, the American Beverage Association sued and sought a preliminary injunction against its enforcement.

After the district court denied the requested preliminary injunction, the Ninth Circuit reversed.  The court concluded that, despite some recent uncertainty regarding the appropriate test, the Supreme Court’s decision in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985), required an inquiry into whether San Francisco’s warning label was (1) purely factual, (2) non-controversial, and (3) not unjustified or unduly burdensome.

In the court’s view, the ordinance was likely to fail the Zauderer test’s third prong because the warning label was unduly burdensome.  The record indicated that a warning label half the size (i.e., 10% of the advertising area) would adequately accomplish the city’s primary objectives of warning consumers about the harms of sugar-sweetened beverages and reducing their consumption.  Moreover, San Francisco failed to show that the sizeable, contrasting label would not “drown out” the rest of the advertisement and would not effectively rule out the possibility of having an advertisement in the first place.  The panel cautioned, however, that it did not intend to set a per se rule that 10% warning labels were acceptable while 20% labels were not.

Three judges concurred in the judgment but departed from the majority’s reason.  Judge Ikuta would have instead applied the framework from the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra,  ___U.S. ___, 138 S.Ct. 2361 (2018).  Chief Judge Thomas would have concluded that the warning was not “purely factual.” And Judge Nguyen disagreed with the majority’s application of Zauderer to speech that was not false, deceptive, or misleading but still concluded that a preliminary injunction was appropriate.

Full opinion available here: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/16-16072/16-16072-2019-01-31.html