The Lindsey-Flanigan Courthouse plaza should be open to expressive activity, at least according to the federal district court in Colorado. Source: Glass Magazine.

In a case close to home (for us, at least), a group of citizen pamphleteers sued the City and County of Denver and the Colorado Second Judicial District court, claiming that prohibitions on expressive activity in the plaza outside of Denver’s Lindsey-Flanigan Courthouse violated the First Amendment. Continue Reading Federal Court Finds Plaintiffs Likely to Prevail in Denver Courthouse Free Speech Case

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Considering the issue for the first time, the Eleventh Circuit joined the Ninth in holding that the act of tattooing is sheltered by the First Amendment. Continue Reading Eleventh Circuit: Tattooing is Protected Speech; Jimmy Buffet Lyrics Do Not Establish a Significant Government Interest

ArchitectureArt, LLC is a mural painting company that painted wall murals on buildings in San Diego, California. Continue Reading California’s 90-Day Limitations Period for Zoning Challenges Does Not Apply in Facial Attack on San Diego Sign Ordinance

A digital billboard in Los Angeles. Source: Los Angeles Times, http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-1023-billboard-20141023-story.html.

Like many cities, Los Angeles prohibits off-site commercial signs for purposes of promoting traffic safety and community aesthetic character. Continue Reading Commercial-Noncommercial and Onsite-Offsite Distinctions Upheld Under California Constitution

The Town of Southeast’s sign regulations provided an exemption from permitting for political signs, so long as their placement did not exceed 21 days. In 2011, the code was amended to provide that the posting could occur up to 21 days before the event being advertised, and the signs had to be removed five days after the event.  Durational limits were not placed on other types of noncommercial signage.  In 2011, the plaintiff was charged in town court with a violation of the sign regulations for posting her political signs in the right-of-way and more than five days after an election.  In 2013, the Town amended the code again to limit the number of political signs to one per candidate per parcel.  In 2014, the Town amended the sign code to create strict limitations on all temporary signs, but exempted construction signs, portable business signs, real estate “for sale” signs, holiday decorations, agricultural produce advertising, and some other signs. Continue Reading New York Town’s Political Sign Regulations Found Invalid

Following post-Reed decisions in other courts, the federal district court in Massachusetts has found Lowell’s ban on aggressive panhandling content based and unconstitutional.  

McLaughlin v. City of Lowell, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2015 WL 6453144 (D. Mass. Oct. 23, 2015)

Bloomington, Minnesota required door-to-door solicitors to obtain a city-issued license.  The regulation defined solicitor in part as “an individual who goes from place-to-place . . . without an invitation from the owner or occupant, for the purpose of: (1) advertising, promoting, selling, leasing, installing or explaining any product, service, organization or cause; (2) seeking donations of money or property on behalf of any nonprofit, political or educational organization or for the purpose of procuring orders for the sale of merchandise or personal services for future delivery or future performance.”  A First Amendment challenge was brought by a nonprofit labor organization.  The federal district court found that the ordinance’s definition of “solicitor” was facially content based and subject to strict scrutiny.  The court held that the ordinance’s crime prevention goals were not a compelling governmental interest, and that the city had not chosen the least restrictive means of preventing crime.

Working America, Inc. v. City of Bloomington, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2015 WL 67567089 (D. Minn. Nov. 4, 2015)

The post-Reed assault on panhandling bans continued when a federal court in Massachusetts held that the City of Worcester’s ordinance prohibiting aggressive panhandling was content based and unconstitutional.  In 2014, in an opinion authored by retired Supreme Court Justice David Souter, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that Worcester’s anti-panhandling ordinance was content neutral and constitutional.  Following Reed, the Supreme Court granted a cert petition in the case, vacated the First Circuit decision, and remanded the matter back to the court of appeals.  The First Circuit then vacated its opinion and judgment and remanded to the district court for further consideration in light of Reed.  Back at the district court, the ordinances—which defined “begging” or “panhandling” as “asking for money or objects of value with the intention that the money or object be transferred at that time and at that place” and also defined “aggressive manner”—were found to be content based, since they applied to particular speech based on the content of the speech.  The court went on to find that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored, as it was not the least restrictive means of achieving the governmental interest at stake.   Continue Reading Another Anti-Panhandling Ordinance Bites the Dust

Brigitte Vosse, a Manhattan designer and resident of New York City’s Upper West Side, can no longer display her illuminated peace sign in the window of her top-floor condominium unit in the famed 111-year-old Ansonia building, now that a federal district court has ruled that New York City’s ban on illuminated signs extending more than 40 feet above curb level has been found content neutral and a proper time, place, and manner restriction on speech.  Although the law in question excepted flags, banners, or pennants on lots containing civic, philanthropic, educational, or religious community facilities, the federal district court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals both found that the law was content neutral.  Back at the district court, the court found that the restriction on illuminated signs above 40 feet was supported by a significant governmental purpose—aesthetic quality—and that the restriction was narrowly tailored to that interest.  The court also found that, because Vosse could display a non-illuminated version of her sign, ample alternative channels were available for conveying her message. Continue Reading New York City Can Force Resident to Remove High-Rise Peace Sign